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inspection and the law of the forum gave him an absolute right, if the
law of the forum were applied.
Ohio, on the basis of the 4merican Shipbuilding Co.' case, appears
to follow the "Law of the forum" rule. However, in the case of
State ex rel. Templin v. Farmer,'1 the court applied the law of the state
of incorporation to compel a foreign corporation to permit an inspection
of its books. Since the statute involved in the Shipbuilding Co." case
has been repealed, it would seem that the courts of Ohio have a choice
as to which of the rules they will apply in the future. Under Ohio G.C.
8623-63 the court could as easily say it did not apply to foreign corpor-
ations as they could say that it did. The State ex rel. Templin case'
might have enough weight to swing the court to that view.
CRIMINAL LAW
THE NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ALLOWED TO
THE STATE IN A JOINT TRIAL OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE;
THE EFFECT OF ALLOWING THE STATE Too
MANY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES UPON
THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT
In a joint trial of a capital offense the trial court allowed the state
seven peremptory challenges. The defendant did not exhaust his allot-
ment of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held unanimously
that allowing seven peremptory challenges was a violation of -Ohio G.C.
sec. 13443-4 by which "in capital cases.., the state and the defendant
may each peremptorily challenge six of the jurors . . ." and that this
section was not qualified by Ohio G.C. sec. 13443-6 which stipulates
the number of challenges allowed in criminal cases other than those
specifically provided for and then continues ". . . but if two or more
persons are jointly tried, the prosecuting attorney shall be entitled to
challenge peremptorily a number equal to the total challenges said
defendants so jointly tried are entitled to." The court further held that,
applying Ohio G.C. sec. 13449-5 which permits reversal of a judg-
ment of conviction only where "it shall affirmatively appear from the
record that the accused was prejudiced thereby or was prevented from
having a fair trial," this was not reversible error where defendant was
40 9 O.c.C. N.S. 584, 36 O.C.C. 668 (Igxz).
'4 O.C.D. 614 (1892).
" Supra, note 40.
"Supra, note 4.
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not prejudiced thereby.' Appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was
dismissed on the ground that no debatable constitutional question was
involved."
At the time of this decision no court had determined the number
of peremptory challenges permitted to the state in a joint trial of a
capital offense under Ohio G. C. sec. 13443-4. Consequently, as
peremptory challenges can be exercised only to the extent authorized
by statute, for it is alone by such authority that they exist,3 the court
could only depend upon its own interpretation of the statute for its
decision. It would seem that the claim of the state to a jury which will
fairly try the case is as strong as the like claim of the defendant, for the
rights of the former are not inferior to those of the latter in this respect;
both should have an equal opportunity to obtain a satisfactory jury. The
court's decision in this case would not give such an equal opportunity, for
it gives the prosecution but half the total number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed to the two defendants. Historically, the trend in Ohio
has been towards equalizing the number of peremptory challenges
allowed to the prosecution and to the defendant by increasing those of the
former, while decreasing those of the latter.4 This trend culminated
in Ohio G.C. sec. 13443-4 and sec. 13443-6 which became effective
in 1929 and which gave both parties an equal number of challenges.
It doesn't seem likely that the Legislature intended to nullify this
accomplishment by allowing the state only six challenges under Ohio
G.C. sec. 13443-3 which became effective in 1935 and which per-
mitted joint trials in capital cases. Both Ohio G.C. sec. 13443-4 and
Sec. 13443-6 were passed by the Legislature at the same time and, it
would seem, should be read together as successive parts of the same
thought as follows: the state and the defendant may each peremptorily
challenge six jurors in capital cases and four jurors in all other criminal
cases, but if two or more persons are jointly tried, the prosecuting
attorney shall be entitled to challenge peremptorily a number equal to the
total challenges said defendants so jointly tried are entitled to. This
would effectuate the desired result.
'State v. Bohannon, 64 Ohio App. 431, 28 N.E. (zd) loo (940).
-State v. Bohannon; 137 Ohio St. 5S2, z8 N.E. (zd.) 201 (1940).
"Stevenson v. State, 70 Ohio St II, 70 N.E. Sio (904).
In 1847, under prior statutes, the defendant charged with murder in the first degree
had twenty-three peremptory challenges. Martin v. State, 16 Ohio 364 (z847). In 1857
it xwas established by authority of see. 15 of the statute relating to juries passed by the
legislature Feb. 9, 1831, that the state had a right to exercise two peremptory challenges
in capital ca'es. Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 9S (s57). By OHiO G.C. see 13649, effective
May 59, 19oS, and now superseded, the state was entitled to peremptorily challenge four
of the panel. By OHio G.C. sec. 13647, of the same date, and which also has been super-
,eded, the defendant in a capital case could peremptorily challenge sixteen of the panel.
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Although the majority of the other states have similar statutes, a
California decision5 was the only case found interpreting such a statute.
This decision held that the state's number of peremptory challenges in a
joint trial of a capital offense was equal to the sum of the challenges
allotted to each defendant and that this number was independent of
the number exercised by the defendants. However, the California
statute6 makes the legislative intent clear, thus leaving the court little
necessity of choosing between two interpretations, and thus not aiding
us much here. Several decisions exist which are no longer the law
because of a subsequent change in the statute. These may serve as
examples of the various possible attitudes. One view is that the state
is to have a number of challenges equal to the total of the number
allocated to each defendant.' The opposite view is shown by several
cases which allowed the state the same number of challenges regardless
of the number allowed to the defendants.' In agreement with the
latter group is an Ohio case.9
When we come to the consequences of allowing the state excessive
challenges, and thereby excluding a competent juror, we again have no
precedent in Ohio to rely upon. However, we are guided generally by
the attitude expressed in Ohio G.C. sec. 13449-5 and by the court's
interpretation of this section.'" Here, however, other states have passed
upon the question. Although there are a few decisions to the contrary,1
the majority of the cases hold that although the court wrongfully
excluded a competent juror, such error will not be cause for reversal
unless the defendant has been prejudiced thereby.'12 The right of the
defendant is to a trial by an impartial jury; it is not the right that any
particular set of men shall be his triers, but that those selected for the
office shall be such as possess the requisite qualifications of impartiality."
The defendant's right is not of selection of the jury, but of rejection of
People v. Pillbro, z6o Pac. 303 (Cal. App., 1927).
o CAL. PEN. CODE, sec. 107o and sec. io98.
'Spies v. People, 2z Ill. 1, 52 N.E. 865 (1887).
8 Shoeflter v. State, 3 Wis. 8z3 (1854); State v. Caron, 4z So. 96o (La. 5898).
Mahan v. State, so Ohio 232 (1840).
10 Moon v. State, 124 Ohio St. 465, 179 N.E. 350 (5935).
"State v. Bertrand, 167 La. 373, 559 So. z65 (gz8); State v. Hammond, z4
S.D. 545, 86 N.W. 627 (1901); Foutch v. State, ioo Tenn. 334, 45 S.W. 678 (899);
Montague v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. 767, 50 Grat. 76 (1853).
'2People v. Durrant, ss6 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. 75 (1897); John D.C. v. State, s6 Fla.
554 (5878); Watson v. State, 63 Ind. 548 (5878); Snow v. Weeks, 75 Me. 105 (5883);
O'Brien v. Iron-Works, 7 Mo. App. Z57 (1879); Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. z2o (5876);
Fishburne v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 1023, 50 S.E. 443 (19o5); Clores Case, 8 Grat.
6o6 (i85I); Thompson v. Douglas, 35 W.Va. 337, 13 S.E. 1075 (5895); Sutton v. Fox,
55 Wis. 531, 13 N.W. 477 (588z); I TuomPsON, TRIALS (ist ed. 1889) sec. I2O.
'Bixbee v. State, 6 Ohio 86 (1833).
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an objectionable juror." As long as the defendant has been tried by an
impartial jury he has had all he is entitled to and a re-trial would give
him no more. One single man is not better to try the defendant's case
than the rest of the state." However, if the defendant had exhausted
his preremptory challenges and the prosecution, by use of excessive
peremptory challenges, had forced upon the defendant a juror who was
partial to the prosecution, then such error would be cause for reversal.
Even though the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges,
such would not necessarily mean there was prejudicial error. Ohio G.C.
sec. 13449-5 would seem to include in reversible errors only those
which are prejudicial. Only in several of the many cases cited in the
opinion of the court was the fact mentioned that the defendant had not
exhausted his peremptory challenges. The principal case certainly stands
with the majority rule when defendant has not exhausted his peremptory
challenges. It would seem probable that its position would be unchanged
even though the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges.
R. D. S.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Is ALIMONY MANDATORY WHEN DIVORCE IS AT
AGGRESSION OF THE HUSBAND?
Because of the aggression of her husband, Margaret Hardy was
granted a divorce on her cross-petition for divorce, alimony and custody
of the children. In awarding the custody of the children to their mother
the trial court ordered that "said defendant shall have for their mainte-
nance the sum of seventeen dollars per week." On appeal the Court
of Appeals unanimously held that this order does not meet the manda-
tory provisions of Ohio G.C. sec. 1 199o, that the court shall allow
"alimony" out of the husband's property.'
The origin of the doctrine of alimony is based upon the common law
obligation of the husband to support his wife.2 Founded upon consid-
erations of equity and public policy, the natural and legal duty of the
husband to support his wife does not cease when there is a legal separation
or divorce because of his misconduct.? Where this obligation of mainte-
U O'Brien v. Iron-Works, 7 Mo. App. 2S7 (x879).
'Thompson v. Douglas, I3 S.E. ioi5 (W.Va. i891).
'Hardy v. Hardy, 64 Ohio App. zS, 17 Ohio Op. 316, z7 N.E. (zd) 497 (1940).
'Albert v. Albert, 7 Ohio App. xS6, at x59, z8 Ohio C.A. zzs, 29 Ohio C.C. 27x
(z916).
'Fickel v. Granger, 83 Ohio St. 101, 93 N.E. 527, 32 L.R.A. (N.s.) 270, 2x Ann.
Cas. 1347 (1910).
